Mali’s Gold Tax Victory Is Shrinking the Base It Was Meant to Tax

Mali’s attempt to extract more value from its gold industry is producing an uncomfortable result: the state is collecting more from each ounce while the number of ounces available to tax is falling.

A mines-ministry plan reported by Reuters forecasts industrial gold output of 43.2 metric tons in 2026, rising to 51.2 tons in 2027 and 57 tons in 2028 before slipping to 50 tons in 2029. Even the peak would remain below the 66.5-ton record reached in 2023. Industrial reserves are projected to decline from 906.8 tons this year to 748.6 tons by 2029.

That is not simply a geological story. It is the balance-sheet consequence of a harder fiscal regime, delayed permits, disputes with foreign operators and weaker investment across some of Mali’s largest mines.

Gold itself offered little new price signal over the weekend. Samarium’s internal series was unchanged at $4,052.78 an ounce between the first and latest observations in the past 24 hours, with no intraday variation recorded. The flat tape makes the supply-side development more useful than another rate or dollar recap: Mali is showing how resource nationalism can tighten future production even when bullion prices remain historically high.

The 2023 mining code increased the state’s potential participation in new projects to as much as 35%, combining a free 10% interest, an option to acquire another 20% and a possible 5% allocation to local investors. It also removed exemptions, strengthened local-content obligations and introduced a more aggressive royalty structure linked to gold prices.

At prices above $4,000, those provisions matter. B2Gold’s disclosures show that Mali’s gold royalty rises with the metal price and that Fekola’s 2026 all-in sustaining cost guidance includes roughly $910 an ounce of royalties and production taxes. Each additional $100 in gold is expected to add about $23 an ounce to Fekola’s reported AISC.

The state has therefore created a mechanism that captures more upside automatically. But it has also made every permit, expansion and mine-life decision more sensitive to political and fiscal risk.

Fekola illustrates the tension. B2Gold expects the complex to produce 410,000 to 460,000 ounces in 2026, down from 530,769 ounces in 2025. Its regional deposits could add 60,000 to 80,000 ounces this year and average roughly 180,000 ounces annually once fully ramped, yet that growth depends on exploitation approvals and stable terms. The ore and infrastructure exist; the bottleneck is regulatory certainty.

Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto complex shows the more severe version. A prolonged tax and ownership dispute led to state administration, seized gold, detained employees and interrupted operations before a settlement returned control to Barrick. Production has improved since then, but contractors have exited and investment was cut during the stand-off. That damage cannot be reversed as quickly as a legal agreement can be signed.

Resolute Mining and Allied Gold face the same national policy, even though their operating situations differ. Resolute previously paid to settle a tax dispute after executives were detained. Allied’s Sadiola mine, by contrast, delivered record quarterly production in late 2025 and entered 2026 with more equipment and plant upgrades. Mali’s forecast assumes those assets continue contributing, but it also shows that stronger performance at one mine is not enough to offset disruption elsewhere.

The government can point to a tangible fiscal win. Officials said an audit recovered 761 billion CFA francs, about $1.2 billion, in alleged arrears. Gold accounts for roughly 80% of Mali’s exports, so the pressure to secure a larger national share is understandable. More than two million people are estimated to depend on mining for income, while the state needs revenue for infrastructure, security and basic services.

The risk is that Mali is optimising the tax rate instead of the tax base.

A project that pays a higher royalty but produces later, at a smaller scale or not at all can leave the treasury worse off over a mine’s full life. Declining reserves in the ministry plan are particularly important because they suggest exploration and conversion are not replacing depletion fast enough. That weakens future output, employment and export receipts even if today’s fiscal take rises.

The plan also assumes artisanal and small-scale output remains around six tons a year. That segment is difficult to measure and tax, and part of its production can leak into informal or illicit channels. If formal industrial supply contracts while artisanal output remains opaque, the state may gain control over fewer traceable ounces rather than more of the total market.

For the global gold market, Mali’s projected shortfall is not large enough by itself to move a $4,000-an-ounce market. The country’s expected 2026 industrial output equals about 1.39 million ounces, a modest fraction of global mine supply. But Mali is a useful warning for other producing states: high bullion prices make tougher fiscal terms tempting precisely when companies are deciding whether to fund marginal expansions, deep underground developments and long-dated exploration.

The next catalyst is not the gold price. It is whether Mali can turn its stronger state position into predictable agreements that unlock Fekola Regional, restore Loulo-Gounkoto’s operating momentum and keep capital flowing to Syama and Sadiola.

If it can, the production curve may recover toward the ministry’s 2028 target. If it cannot, the government may discover that a larger share of a shrinking industry is not the same as more durable mining revenue.