Can Australia break China’s near‑monopoly on rare earths?

China controls roughly 90% of global rare‑earth processing capacity, giving it outsized leverage over materials used in EVs, wind turbines and advanced defence systems. Rare earths like neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium are abundant geologically but costly and complex to extract, separate and refine into usable oxides. Decades of Chinese investment built an integrated downstream industry; occasional export restrictions and market flooding have demonstrated how that control can be used as geopolitical leverage. Australia is attempting to develop an alternative supply chain. Iluka Resources has a long‑built stockpile of mineral sands at Eneabba and is constructing a refinery, supported by a reported A$1.65 billion government loan, to separate rare‑earth oxides by 2027. That feedstock would only last about seven years unless other miners supply ore, and further projects face price volatility and competition from state‑backed Chinese producers. Policy tools being considered include a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, offtake agreements and a price floor to stabilise returns and attract investment, with an exit or repayment mechanism to protect taxpayers. Success will depend on scaling refining capacity, securing downstream buyers prepared to pay a premium for non‑Chinese supply, and international coordination to create stable demand for responsibly produced rare earths.